As I continue to research the Baker family, John Renta Baker (1735-1820), is the most 'famous' person that I have found, to this point. Baker was a well known soldier in the Revolutionary War and though there is no mention of him in this section of the story, it was his life, his passion and what made him so popular. The stories are a bit long but interest. I don't edit words that others have written so you will always see the story in its entirety. In this situation, I have broken the story down into three parts; this is the second.
Hope you enjoy.
7 OCT 1780 , SOUTH CAROLINA
THE BATTLE OF KINGS MOUNTAIN - PART I - THE SUBJUGATION OF SOUTH
CAROLINA
The causes of the Revolution were but little known to many
of these pioneers beyond the Blue Ridge. They were concerned in the
establishment of their homes, breaking the soil of their new settlements, and
wringing a livelihood from it; and with their rifles securing much of their
sustenance. They sought the seclusion of the western waters; and in the valleys
of the Holston, the Watauga, and the Nolichucky, found freedom in the exercise
of their religion. Had the western covering force of Cornwallis's army, as it
advanced into the Province of North Carolina, confined its activities, to the
plains and lowlands east of the Blue Ridge, and had not Ferguson from Gilbert
Town uttered his threat of fire and sword and the hangman's noose, these
mountain men would probably have remained in their homes, and but few of them
would have joined with those who were in rebellion against the King.
Under the confederated leaders, who commanded at Kings
Mountain, were a few refugees from the lowlands, some small groups from the
counties east of the mountains, and a large number of mountain and backwater
men whose independence was being threatened by an alien invader. In answering
the call to embody under their local leaders, there existed the definite
understanding among these mountain men that they were going into the lowlands
to fight, and that they would not return to their homes until they, or
Ferguson, had been defeated.
At Kings Mountain the defenders used the bayonet and the
rifle until their losses made surrender of the survivors inevitable. The
attackers faced bullet and bayonet, and responded with an expert use of the
rifle, with which they were familiar, due to their frequent stalking of game
and Indians. The mountain men were not accustomed to the bayonet, but they were
expert in taking cover behind rocks and trees. Ferguson was confident that his
position rendered him secure against any untrained and unorganized horde which
might attack him. His Provincial Corps were trained in the use of the bayonet
and were commanded by competent leaders. The militia had received some limited
training in the art of war, and were provided with long hunting knives to be
attached to their rifles, in lieu of the bayonet. Their marksmanship was not as
effective as was that of the mountain men, as conditions of life in the
lowlands were not such as to make their daily existence dependent upon accurate
use of the rifle. Ferguson was a trained soldier, an able leader, and, together
with Tarleton, one of Cornwallis's most valuable lieutenants.
In both the Carolinas there was a large number of citizens,
and probably a majority, whose sympathies at one time or another in 1780 were
with the Royal Government. They believed that a rebellion could not, and should
not, succeed. In commenting on the internecine warfare carried on without
cessation, General Greene wrote on the 23d of May, 1781, more than five months
after he had assumed command of the Southern Department:
The animosity between the Whigs and Tories of this State
renders their situation truly deplorable. There is not a day passes but there
are more or less who fall a sacrifice to this savage disposition. The Whigs
seem determined to extirpate the Tories and the Tories the Whigs. Some
thousands have fallen in this way in this quarter, and the evil rages with more
violence than ever. If a stop can not be put to these massacres, the country
will be depopulated in a few months more, as neither Whig nor Tory can live.The
Battle of Kings Mountain was not an isolated action; it was the high spot of
1780 in the South. The surrender of Charleston, the defeat of the American
forces at Camden on the 16th of August, of Sumter two days later, the many
engagements of lesser importance, all added prestige to the royal cause,
resulting in the complete subjugation of Georgia and South Carolina. Cornwallis
had advanced as far as Charlotte Town in North Carolina and was preparing to
move his headquarters to Salisbury, when the unexpected blow delivered by the
mountain men at Kings Mountain brought to an immediate end the thought of
further conquest and made necessary the withdrawal of the British forces into
South Carolina and the assumption of a defensive role for several months
thereafter. Therefore, to have an intelligent understanding of the Battle of
Kings Mountain and its effect upon the southern campaign of 1780, it is necessary
to know something of the movements of the King's forces from the time
Charleston was invested.
In the latter part of 1779 the Americans made an
unsuccessful attempt to recover Savannah from the British, and following this
failure the French fleet, which supported the move, departed for the West
Indies. Clinton and Arbuthnot now considered the time propitious to make
another attempt against Charleston, with the idea of occupying the Carolinas,
giving support to the Tories and popularizing the Crown cause. Furthermore,
such a move would result in curtailing colony traffic with Europe by way of the
Chesapeake.
Upon completion of their plans, the amphibious expedition
under Clinton and Arbuthnot sailed from its base, New York, December 26, 1779.
Charleston Harbor was occupied, siege laid to the city, and on the 12th of May
General Lincoln surrendered the town and its garrison.
Upon the capitulation of Charleston, Clinton considered that
the major effort in the subjugation of the Province had been accomplished, and
that, with this showing of the power of the Crown, most of the inhabitants
would join the loyal cause. It would be necessary, of course, to occupy the
country with a considerable land force, and thereby give protection to loyal
sympathizers, but it was thought that the British regular force under his
command would be largely augmented by Tory militia, who would aid in keeping
the revolutionists suppressed.
Cornwallis commanded in the field, and on May 17 had a force
of regulars to the number of 2,542 rank and file, which Clinton believed would
be sufficient, when augmented by militia, to subjugate South Carolina and
continue the campaign into North Carolina. At the same time Cornwallis was
advised that in view of the importance of his mission, troops were not to be
stinted, and he was offered, by Clinton, any that he might desire from the
garrisons of the several forts. For the initiation of the campaign, his array
was to be augmented by the light infantry and the Forty-second Regiment, with
the understanding that they were to be returned to Clinton as soon as they
could be spared, as his contemplated operations to the northward would be
cramped without them. Cornwallis was of the belief that he had sufficient
regular forces to eventually control all the territory from the Floridas to
Virginia, and on the 18th of May wrote Clinton that he would regret to see left
behind any part of the troops destined for use elsewhere, and unless
considerable reinforcements of Continentals should come from the northward to
join the revolutionists, he would not need more assistance. He suggested that
the publication of intelligence by Clinton that he and Arbuthnot were moving to
the Chesapeake would probably stop off, on those waters, any reinforcements
intended for the Carolinas. In case Clinton learned before sailing to the north
that enemy reinforcements were well on their way, Cornwallis asked that his
command be increased by some five or six hundred British or Hessians. It will
be noted later that at this time Washington and Congress were preparing
Maryland and Delaware troops, under De Kalb, to march to the South, and that,
by resolution of Congress, these two States were transferred to the Southern
Department.
On May 20 the light infantry and the Forty-second Regiment,
promised to Cornwallis to supplement his forces temporarily, marched to Monks
Comer and reported. At this time both the commander in chief and Cornwallis
were hopeful that South Carolina would offer but little resistance to complete
subjugation, although there was, in Clinton's mind, a measure of doubt, for he
knew that the entire success of the campaign would depend upon whether or not
"'the temper of our friends in those districts is such as it has always
been represented to us."
The time arrived when Clinton and the fleet could no longer
delay departure for the north. La Fayette had returned to America on April 27,
with the promise of his Government that a French fleet and army would follow
him in a short time. Information of this early augmentation of the enemy forces
reached Arbuthnot and Clinton, and they deemed it advisable to assemble the
fleet and troops at New York, and for the time being make no move against the
Chesapeake. Cornwallis was instructed that after he had finished his southern
campaign of subjugation, and by his presence and show of force convinced the
people that it was to their best interests to maintain allegiance to the Crown,
he was to leave in the South such forces as he might consider necessary to
dominate the territory, and send the remainder to the Chesapeake to assist in
the operations which were to be undertaken there as soon as Clinton was
relieved of the apprehension of a superior fleet and the season was far enough
advanced to permit of campaigning in that climate. It was supposed at the time
that the move to the Chesapeake could be undertaken in September or the early
part of October. Cornwallis was to command the troops which would be
concentrated for this operation.
From his headquarters in the field, Cornwallis corresponded
with loyalists in North Carolina, informing them of his hopes for the prompt
subjugation of South Carolina and advising with them as to what immediate
militant acts, if any, they should engage in. It was not desired that any partisan
of the King should become very active in the field at this time, for fear that
the rebels would likewise become embodied and produce a situation inimical to
the success of his army when it approached the border of the Province. However,
if the loyalists considered themselves a match for the Whigs, and were
determined to rise without further delay, he promised all the assistance in his
power, by incursions of light infantry and furnishing ammunition. It soon
became evident that this hopeful view of any early conquest was not to be
realized, for there were many questions of supply and transportation to be
arranged before the army could move far from its base, and matters of civil
administration to be adjusted, so that the government of the territory in rear
of the royal army would offer safety to the troops.
Cornwallis had established his headquarters at Camden while
Clinton and Arbuthnot were still at Charleston. On their departure, June 5, for
New York, the responsibility for the campaign, and the safety of the loyalists
and Tories in the occupied territory, rested upon Cornwallis solely. He
arranged for the enrollment of militia under the British flag, for the
organization and functioning of civil administration, and modified the
proclamations issued at Charleston by Clinton and Arbuthnot June 1, and that of
Clinton the 3d, so that greater protection would be given those who were loyal
to the Crown and more severe punishment meted out to those in rebellion; and at
the same time provided for the needs of his army. His command of 4,000 regular
troops and a few Provincials had not only to occupy several important posts
widely distant from each other, but from their numbers maintain in the field a
force of sufficient strength to withstand local partisans and oppose rein,
forcing troops marching from the north. Posts were established from the Peedee
to the Savannah to awe the disaffected and encourage the loyal inhabitants, and
measures were taken to raise some Provincial Corps and to establish a militia,
as well for the defense as for the internal government of South Carolina.
In the district of Ninety Six, which was viewed as the most
populous and powerful in the Province, Lieutenant Colonel Balfour, assisted by
Major Ferguson, who had been appointed inspector general of militia by Clinton,
formed 7 battalions of militia of about 4,000 men, which organizations were so
regulated that they could furnish 1,500 men at short notice for the defense of
the frontier, or for any other home service. In addition to the militia, a
Provincial Corps of 500 men was commissioned to be raised under command of
Lieutenant Colonel Cunningham.
Other battalions of militia were formed along the extensive
line—Broad River to Cheraws—but they were in general either weak, or not much
to be relied on for their fidelity." The refugees who were now returning
to their native country, were organized into the First South Carolina Regiment.
A Provincial Corps, to consist of 500 men, was put in
commission, to be raised between the Peedee and Wateree, under the command of
Major Harrison. In order to protect the raising of this corps, and to awe this
large tract of disaffected country the Seventy-first Regiment and a troop of
dragoons under Major McArthur were posted at Cheraw Hill on the Peedee.
Other small posts were likewise established in the front and
on the left of Camden, at which place the main body of the army was posted, and
which was considered a fairly healthy place for the troops.
Having made the above arrangements, and everything wearing
the face of tranquillity and submission, Cornwallis set out on the 21st of June
for Charleston, leaving the command of the troops on the frontier to Lord
Rawdon, who was, after Brigadier General Patterson, the commandant at
Charleston, the next in rank in the southern district.
It was about this time that Cornwallis changed the
instructions previously given his friends in the northern Province relative to
their rising in aid of the Crown. He now considered it ill advised to march his
army through North Carolina before the harvest, and took strong measures to
induce impatient partisans not to rise until after the crops had been gathered,
and under no conditions to act until he advised them that the time was
propitious.
On June 30 he wrote to Clinton that with the capitulation of
Ninety Six, and the dispersion of a party of rebels who had assembled at an
ironwork on the northwest border of the Province, there was an end to all
resistance in South Carolina. He reported the forces of the enemy in North
Carolina as about 100 militia under General Caswell, 400 or 500 militia at or
near Salisbury under General Rutherford, and 300 Virginians in that
neighborhood under Porterfield. The force which gave him the most concern,
however, was 2,000 Maryland and Delaware troops under Major General Baron De
Kalb.
Now that the strongholds in the northwest part of South
Carolina were in his possession, Cornwallis thought he could leave this Province
in security, and march about the beginning of September with a body of troops
into the back part of North Carolina, "with the greatest probability of
reducing that Province to its duty." Having in mind Clinton's instructions
that troops which could be spared later would be used at a probable early date
on the Chesapeake, Cornwallis wrote in regard to his contemplated move into
North Carolina:
I am of opinion that (besides the advantage of possessing so
valuable a Province) it would prove an effectual barrier for South Carolina and
Georgia; and could be kept, with the assistance of our friends there, by as few
troops as would be wanted on the borders of this Province, if North Carolina
should remain in the hands of our enemies.
This hopeful view of the situation, based largely upon the
success of the royal arms up to this time, was soon to be shattered. While
Cornwallis was still at Charleston his intelligence reported that Sumter, with
about 1,500 militia, was advancing from the north as far as the Catawba
settlement, and that many disaffected South Carolinians from the Waxhaw and
other settlements on the frontier, whom Lord Rawdon at Camden had put on
parole, were availing themselves of the general release of the 20th of June,
and joining Sumter. It was also reported that De Kalb's army was continuing its
movement south, followed by 2,500 Virginia militia. Cornwallis informed Clinton
of these developments in a letter of July 14, stating:
The effects of the exertions which the enemy are making in
these two Provinces, will, I make no doubt, be exaggerated to us. But upon the
whole there is every reason to believe that their plan is not only to defend
North Carolina, but to commence offensive operations immediately; which reduces
me to the necessity, if I wanted the inclination, of following the plan which I
had the honor of transmitting to your excellency in my letter of the 30th of
June, as the most effectual means of keeping up the spirits of our friends and
securing this Province.
The plan referred to by Cornwallis was the occupation of
North Carolina, and holding it as the frontier of the southern district.
The work of supplying the base at Camden with salt, rum,
regimental stores, arms, and ammunition was under way, so that a further
advance of the army beyond that point would be safe, guarded. Due to the
distance of transportation and the excessive heat of the season, the work was
one of infinite labor, requiring considerable time. Then, too, the several
actions in which his forces had been engaged made Cornwallis more and more
doubtful as to the value of his militia. He wrote to Clinton that dependence
upon these troops for protecting and holding in South Carolina, in case of an
advance of his army into North Carolina, was precarious, as their want of
subordination and confidence in themselves would make a considerable regular
force always necessary for the defense of the Province, until North Carolina
was completely subjugated.
The plan of campaign of the Crown forces to the north
contemplated using Ferguson's corps, augmented by militia of the Ninety Six
district who were being trained by Ferguson, as a left covering force to
advance to the borders of Tryon County, now Rutherford and Lincoln, paying
particular attention to the mountain regions in securing protection for the
advance of the main body from Camden. Lieutenant Colonel Cruger, who commanded
at Ninety Six, was to remain there with his corps. Innes, with the remainder of
the militia of that district, was to guard the frontier, which would require
careful attention, as there were many disaffected, and many constantly in arms.
The continued advance southward of the American troops
previously reported in North Carolina was known to Cornwallis. While still in
Charleston, on August 9, he received an express from Camden informing him that
General Gates, accompanied by Caswell and Rutherford, was approaching with
every appearance of an intent to attack Lord Rawdon, who had assembled several
regiments on the west branch of Lynches Creek. These troops were more or less
sickly, particularly the Seventy-first Regiment, the two battalions of which
had not more than 274 men under arms. On the 6th Sumter had attacked the
British post at Hanging Rock, where the infantry of the Legion and Governor
Browne's corps were posted. He had been repulsed, but not without difficulty.
These accounts alarmed Cornwallis, and he proceeded from
Charleston to join the army in the field. At the same time he wrote to Clinton:
If we succeed at present, and are able to penetrate into
North Carolina, without which it is impossible to hold this province, your
Excellency will see the absolute necessity of a diversion in the Chesapeake,
and that it must be done early.
Cornwallis reached Camden on the 13th of August. Gates's
command had approached very close, and on the morning of the 16th the two
armies met and fought the Battle of Camden, resulting in the defeat of Gates.
Following this victory, Cornwallis determined upon the destruction or
dispersion of the corps under Sumter, as it might prove a foundation for
assembling the routed army, and on the morning of the 17th he detached
Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton with the Legion cavalry and infantry, and the corps
of light infantry, in all about 350 men, to pursue and attack Sumter. Orders
were also sent to Lieutenant Colonel Turnbull and Major Ferguson, on the Little
River, to put their corps in motion immediately, and on their side to pursue
and attack the same enemy. Tarleton was successful in surprising Sumter on the
18th at Fishing Creek, near the Catawba.. The latter, with a corps of about 800
men, was escorting 250 prisoners and a large quantity of stores, artillery, and
ammunition. Sumter himself escaped, though with difficulty, but his whole corps
was killed, taken, or dispersed.
In writing of the Battle of Camden, Cornwallis stated that
above 1,000 were killed and wounded, and about 800 taken prisoners; that his
army captured 7 pieces of brass cannon, all the enemy ammunition, wagons, a
great number of arms, and 130 baggage wagons; "in short, there never was a
more complete victory." The British loss was reported as 300 killed and
wounded, chiefly of the Thirty-third Regiment and the Volunteers of Ireland.
Among the Americans wounded were Major General Baron De Kalb and Brigadier
General Rutherford. Baron De Kalb died of his wounds. In a letter to Lord
Germain written August 21, Cornwallis said that on arriving in Camden the night
of the 13th, he found there Lord Raw-don's entire force, except a small detachment
under Lieutenant Colonel Turnbull, which fell back from Rocky Mount to Major
Ferguson's posts of the militia at Ninety Six, on Little River.
I had my option to make, either to retire or attack the
enemy, for the position at Camden was a bad one to be attacked in, and by
General Sumpter's advancing down the Wateree, my supplies must have failed me
in a few days.
These two decisive engagements, following so closely upon
each other, brought deep despair to the revolutionists and great elation to the
victors. In Cornwallis's letter to Lord Germain referred to above and written
five days after Camden and three days after the defeat of Sumter, he declared
that the rebel forces were dispersed and that internal commotions and
insurrections in the Province would now subside. He stated that he had given
directions to inflict exemplary punishment on some of the most guilty, in hopes
to deter others in future "from tampering with allegiance, with oaths, and
with the lenity and generosity of the British Government." The orders of
Cornwallis were that all inhabitants of the Province who had submitted, and
later took part in the revolt against the King, should be punished with the
greatest vigor, imprisoned, and their property taken or destroyed. He ordered in
the most positive manner that every militiaman who had borne arms under him,
and afterwards joined the enemy, should be immediately hanged. Cruger, who
commanded at Ninety Six, was directed to take the most vigorous measures to
extinguish the rebellion in his district, and to obey in the strictest manner
the directions given relative to the treatment of the country. It will be seen
later how the execution of these instructions in the region of the Blue Ridge
and Alleghenies resulted in the mountain men swarming from their homes to
defend their freedom and independence.
Now that no further opposition to the advance into North
Carolina existed, on the morning of the 17th of September Cornwallis dispatched
messengers into that Province with directions to his friends there to take arms
and assemble immediately, and to seize the most violent people and all the
military stores and magazines belonging to the rebels, and to intercept all
stragglers from the routed army. He promised to march without loss of time to
their support. Much to Cornwallis's disappointment, however, the people of the
northern Province were not as prompt in rising as he had hoped. Their
inclinations were held in check due to the large number of revolutionists whom
they had observed marching to the south to oppose the royal forces, and they
preferred to await the arrival of the British Army in their neighborhood before
taking an open stand. Cornwallis was hopeful that Clinton would start, at an
early date, the contemplated move to the Chesapeake, thereby relieving the
situation on his northern front. He wrote to him that next to the security of
New York, the operations in the Chesapeake were one of the most important
objects of the war.
About this time Major Wemyss was sent with a detachment of
the Sixty-third Regiment, mounted, some refugees, Provincials, and militia, to
disarm in the most rigid manner the country between the Santee and Peedee, and
to punish severely all those who submitted or pretended to live peaceably under
his majesty s Government since the reduction of Charleston, and who had later
revolted. Cornwallis himself ordered several militiamen to be executed, who had
voluntarily enrolled and borne arms under the British flag and afterwards
revolted to the enemy.
Plans were made to move the first division of the army into
North Carolina by way of Charlotte Town and Salisbury, about September 6 or 7.
The second division would follow in about 10 days with convalescents and
stores. A more prompt move following the successes at Camden and Fishing Creek
could not be made, due to the number of sick and wounded, and the want of
transport. The advance was started on the 8th and Charlotte Town reached the
26th of September.
During September Ferguson operated in Ninety Six and from
there moved into what had been Tryon County, North Carolina, accompanied by
about 800 militia collected from the neighborhood of Ninety Six. Protection was
to be given to the friends of the Crown, who were supposed to be numerous in
that locality, and it was intended that he should pass the Catawba River and
endeavor to preserve tranquillity in the rear and flank of the army. It was
while on this duty that the loss of his entire command occurred at Kings
Mountain on the 7th of the following month. Without some knowledge of Cornwallis's
campaign in South Carolina, and from thence into North Carolina as far as
Charlotte Town, the necessity for his immediate retirement from the northern
Province, following Kings Mountain, would not be understood. It is now
necessary to refer to the group of leaders and the troops which they commanded,
who succeeded, so unexpectedly and so decisively, in dealing this staggering
blow to Ferguson, and in compelling Cornwallis to place his army on the
defensive.
No comments:
Post a Comment